The Senate

by Apathy is Boring — October 12, 2006

An Elected Senate in Detail

From the 1930s to the end of the 20th century, senate reform has periodically appeared in the platform of some political parties. The only reform that took place, however, was that when the Liberals were in power they appointed Liberal senators and when the Tories were in power they appointed Tory senators. The handful of Independents were rare exceptions.
More recently the Reform Party (Alliance) has been pushing the Triple E Senate -
elected, equal and effective. But this American idea wouldn't fly in Canada. We don't have 50 states. We have ten provinces and three territories of vastly different size and population. There is no way that British Columbia, Ontario and Québec would settle for the same number of seats as Prince Edward Island. Other ideas have included giving the power to appoint senators to provincial governments. But this was perceived as potentially fractious and self-serving on the part of the provinces. The search remained for an elected senate which would not have the wide-ranging power of the U.S. Senate but would still act as a genuine check on a House of Commons dominated and dictated to by the government party whip at the whim of an all-powerful prime minister.

The "Jury" Senate

Originally the brain child of Frank Stronach, the concept of a jury senate is novel and meets the test of providing both fundamental reform and a workable system. It would provide both the "sober second thought" that has been the present Senate's principal rationale for continued existence, in the face of pressure to abolish it altogether, and a real populist counter-balance to the near absolute power of Canada's prime ministers - greater, proportionally, than the president of the United States.
The original plan for the "jury" senate called for one senator to be elected for each two electoral districts for a total of 150. The Canadian Action Party has opted instead for one senator for each three electoral districts (approximate) for a total of 101.
There are two reasons for the change. The first reason is practical housekeeping. The present Senate Chamber will accommodate 101 whereas it is too small for 150. Even more compelling is the fact that under the following proposal 101 is ample to balance the power of the Commons while 150 might be too over-powering and dominant. With a 101 total the initial distribution would be something like this. Newfoundland 2, Prince Edward Island 1, Nova Scotia 4, New Brunswick 4, Québec 25, Ontario 34, Manitoba 5, Saskatchewan 5, Alberta 9, British Columbia 11 and the three Northern Territories 1.
In order to keep provincial representation in round numbers some senate constituencies would be slightly more or slightly less than the Commons constituencies. This would not interfere in any way with the smooth operation of the system. The House of Commons would be elected as it is now on a partisan basis. The "jury" senate, on the other hand would be non-partisan and vote as individuals.
Candidates for the "jury" senate would be chosen by the Chief Electoral Officer by computerized random selection from the permanent list of electors. Twenty or twenty-five names would be drawn and they would be asked to indicate whether or not they would like to stand for election.
Those that replied in the affirmative would be asked to submit a two-page summary of their background experience and reasons why they would like to serve in public office, together with a photograph. The Chief Electoral Officer would have the information transcribed in standard form and mail it to each qualified elector in the senatorial district at public expense.
This would eliminate the need for campaigning in the traditional way, putting up signs and buying advertising, which would be prohibited, so that there would be a level playing field between candidates and they would be beholden to no one except the taxpayers at large.
Once elected, the senate would vote with the Commons on all measures. This means that government legislation would have to meet the non-partisan test of the senators.
It is doubtful that measures such as the GST or the restricted compensation for victims of Hepatitis C would have withstood such a test. "Jury" senators would only be allowed to serve for one term unless, by miraculous coincidence, their name was drawn a second time by random sample. This way they would be completely free to vote as their conscience and common sense dictated. The only general exception to the one term rule would be in the event parliament was dissolved before it had served 2 years of its statutory 5 year limit in which case the entire senate would be considered re-elected and only any vacancies existing at the time would be filled by ballot.
The Canadian Action Party is convinced that of all the proposals it has seen so far for senate reform, or an elected senate that the "Jury Senate" is by far the best. It is fair, fundamental and populist. Ordinary voters would have their voices clearly heard without the distortions that often occur when they are screened through political parties. The "Jury Senate" would be a giant step in the direction of a more genuine democracy.

http://www.canadianactionparty.ca/PartyInfo/pdfs/Policies.pdf


Senate Reform Proposals: From a House of the Federation to Triple-E

Efforts to reform the Senate fall into three distinct phases:

Initial reform efforts in the fifty-year period following Confederation

Renewed efforts to reform the Senate beginning in the 1960s

Recent efforts to achieve practical changes that don’t necessitate constitutional amendment

Initial Reform Efforts in the fifty-year period following Confederation

Prior to the Constitution Act, 1982, the provinces were not formally involved in the process of Senate reform. Changes to the Senate’s structure required only passage through both Houses of Parliament, and final consent from Britain. Specific reform proposals date back to the late 1800s:

In 1874, M.P. David Mills introduced a proposal for provincial appointment of Senators in the House of Commons.

In 1906, the House of Commons debated a proposal to limit Senators’ terms to the life of three Parliaments.

In 1909, the Senate debated and rejected a proposal changing the selection of Senators to a combination of election and appointment. Under this proposal, two-thirds of Senators would be elected and serve seven-year terms.

In 1927, Senate reform proposals were discussed at the Dominion Provincial conference.

(None of these proposals were passed.)

Renewed Efforts to Reform the Senate beginning in the 1960s

Renewed Senate reform attempts came from a perceived need to make national institutions more responsive to regional concerns. The initial impetus came from separatist pressures in Quebec. Later, western alienation played a role. One major change came in 1965, when Parliament set a mandatory retirement age of seventy-five for Senators. Two major themes stand out from this period:

With respect to the method of selecting Senators, earlier proposals universally support appointment. Beginning in the 1980s, there is increased support for direct election.

With respect to powers, there is an increasing trend towards creating classes of legislation, with the Senate’s powers dependent on the specific class of legislation.

The ratification of the 1982 Constitution Act removed Parliament's ability to make changes to the Senate without provincial approval. As a result, since 1982, all Senate reform proposals have been part of a larger constitutional package, in which both individual provinces and the federal government compromised to get an agreement. While the amendments failed, dispute over Senate reform did not play a major role in these failures.

Here are three major Senate reform proposals from this period:

House of the Federation (1978)

This proposal was part of the government’s proposals for amending federal institutions contained in Bill C-60. It is based on recommendations made by the Pepin-Robarts Task Force on Canadian Unity, although it doesn’t follow them completely:

The Senate would be transformed into a House of the Federation

Provincial governments would appoint half the delegates to sit in the House of the Federation. The House of Commons would appoint the remaining half.

Provincial representation would be roughly based on population, with overrepresentation of smaller provinces. Both Quebec and Ontario would receive one-fifth of the seats. There would be a maximum of sixty voting members in the House

The powers of the House would depend on the class of legislation.

The House would have a suspensive veto over matters that fell under both federal and provincial jurisdiction.

The duration of the suspensive veto would depend on whether the constitution gave provinces or the federal government paramountcy in this area. (The principle of paramountcy determines which law will prevail when there is a conflict between federal and provincial laws in a certain area. For example, if the federal government had paramountcy, federal law would prevail).

A two-thirds majority of the House would be required for federal treaties falling in areas of provincial jurisdiction

A double majority of French and English speaking Senators would be required for legislation concerning linguistic matters.

A two-thirds majority of the House would be required for the exercise of the federal spending power in areas under provincial jurisdiction.

House approval would be required for appointments to the Supreme Court and other national regulatory agencies.

The House of the Federation Model was based on the German upper house, called the Bundesrat. It is a piece of legislation created by the federal government, without formal input from provincial leaders. Originally, the Pepin-Robarts task force recommended that provincial governments appoint Senators; Bill C-60 allows the provinces to appoint only half the delegates, with the House of Commons appointing the remaining half. Therefore, the PM would still be appointing half the representatives to the upper house. Still, the proposal does give the Upper chamber an absolute veto over certain narrow classes of legislation.

Triple-E Senate (1980s - Current)

The Triple- E Senate does not consist of one specific proposal. Instead, it is an underlying philosophy for implementing Senate reform. In the 1980s, the basis for a Triple-E Senate was laid out in several Canada West publications. The term “Triple-E” stands for “Equal, Effective, Elected.” The main features of the Triple-E Senate are as follows:

Equal provincial representation

Effective powers

Directly elected Senators

While all Triple-E proposals involve equal provincial representation and directly elected Senators, the number of Senators per province, details of the election process, and the powers of the Senate differ. In 1985, the Alberta Select Committee put forth a recommendation for Senate reform based on the Triple-E model that gave the Senate the power to veto any House of Commons legislation except for money or taxation bills. In May 2003, the Report of the Alberta Select Committee on Upper House Reform released a more moderate Triple-E Senate proposal that included the following:

Equal provincial representation, with six Senators per province and two Senators per territory

Direct election of Senators, with the election method to be determined by the province

The ability to amend, delay, or reject ordinary legislation, with a 180 day suspensive veto

An absolute veto over legislation affecting provincial jurisdiction

House approval required for Supreme Court appointments and ratification of national treaties

Charlottetown Accord (1992)

The Charlottetown Accord was PM Brian Mulroney’s final attempt to bring Quebec ‘back into the Constitution” after the failure of the Meech Lake Accord. The Accord was the result of several intense bargaining sessions between the provinces and the federal government, and a series of public hearings. It was presented as a package deal: amending it in any way would cause the entire deal to collapse.
The Senate reform proposals were included to get the western province’s support for clauses recognizing Quebec’s distinct status. They include the following:

Individual provinces could choose between indirect election by provincial legislatures or direct election. 

There would be equal provincial representation in the Senate, with each province being given six seats. In addition, the Northwest Territories and the Yukon would each receive one seat.

Aboriginal representation is guaranteed

Like Bill C-60, the Charlottetown Accord creates classes of legislation.
Senators can amend or reject ordinary legislation, or delay it for thirty days. Defeating or amending the legislation would lead to a joint sitting with the House of Commons. A simple majority would be required to pass the bills.
Senators can amend, reject, or delay revenue and expenditure bills for up to thirty days. After thirty days the House can re-pass the legislation with a simple majority.

Bills affecting French language and culture fall under the double majority rule. To pass, the bill must have the support of both a majority of Senators and a majority of French speaking Senators. The House of Commons cannot override a Senate veto.

The Senate has an absolute veto over legislation related to natural resources. The House of Commons cannot override.

With the exception of money bills, the Senate can initiate legislation

Pundits referred to the Charlottetown Accord’s Senate reform provisions as “Two and a Half E’s.” The Accord fell short of the Triple-E model in effectiveness, giving Senators both more and less power than other proposals. On the one hand, it limited the Senate’s suspensive veto over ordinary legislation to thirty days. While it contained a provision for a joint sitting to break deadlock between the two Houses, the large number of MPs compared to Senators meant this provision would have had little effect. (The only exception might be in cases where the government had a minority government or only a small majority, and where the majority of Senators were from a different party than the government). On the other hand, it gave Senators an absolute veto over natural resources and French language and culture.
The Charlottetown Accord also fell short of the Triple-E model by allowing provinces to choose whether Senators were indirectly elected by provincial legislatures, or directly elected by the public. This was done to gain Quebec’s support for the Accord. However, if the Accord had been ratified, public pressure would probably have forced the remaining nine provinces to implement direct elections.

http://www.mapleleafweb.com/features/parliament/senate-reform/reform-proposals.html